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of doubtful authority. It was there held
that a mill-owner whose dam caused underground streams of water to set back
and injure the land above, is not liable
therefor at common law. But this is in

direct conflict with Bassett v. &1isbury
Manif. Co., 43 N. H. 569, a carefully
considered case.
EDMUND H. BEixI-.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Common Pleas of New York.
MARY E. HYNES ET AL. v. KATE McDERMOTT ET AL.
By the law of New York marriage is a civil contract and nothing more.
The validity of a marriage is to be determined by the lex loci contractus.
An agreement of marriage per verba de prcesenti is a valid marriage by the common
and civil law as well as by the law of New York; and in the absence of evidence
of the law of France the courts of New York will presume such a marriage in Fradce
to be valid.

THIS was an action of ejectment by the plaintiff, as widow and
heirs at law of William R. Hynes, deceased, for tthe recovery of
mesne profits of premises situated in the city of New York.
The action was originally commenced against the tenants in possession, and was subsequently amended by the joinder of the heirs
at law of the deceased intestate, the acknowledged owner of the
premises in dispute.
John .fallock Drake, for appellants.
William _H. Secor and Joseph Hf. Choate, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LARREMORE, J.-The main question to be decided is that which
relates to the marriage between the parties and the legitimacy of
the children as a result of such marriage. In addition to the general issue, the judge, at trial term, submitted the following special
findings of fact:
First. Did William R. Hynes and the plaintiff, Mary Eliza
Hynes, at 169 Cleveland street, in the city of London, enter into
an agreement to be then and thenceforward man and wife, upon the
occasion in the evening of the last Wednesday of May 1871, testified to by Mr. and Mrs. Ardray?
Second. Did William R. Hynes and the plaintiff, Mary Eliza
Hynes, thenceforward cohabit together in the open and acknow.
ledged relation of man and wife?
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Third. Was William R. Hynes, at the time of said agreement,
a citizen of the state of New York and temporarily sojourning in
England?
Fourth. Was the agreement made with the bona fide intention,
on the part of William R. Hynes, to contract a valid marriage,
according to the law of the state of New York, and to return to
the said state and reside there with the said Mary E. Hynes, as his
wife, and did that intention continue up to the time of his death ?
Fifth. Did William R. Hynes, deceased, and Mary E. Hynes,
in May or June 1871, while crdssing the English chanhel, enter
into an agreement by which they consented to take each other then
and there as man and wife?
Sixth. Did William R. Hynes, deceased, and Mary E. Hynes,
in June 1871, in France, enter into an agreement by which they
consented to take each other then and there as man and wife?
Seventh. Is the infant plaintiff, William R. Hynes, the child
of William R. Hynes, deceased?
Upon all of said special findings the jury found in the affirmative.
This appeal being from the order denying the motion for a new
trial on the judge's minutes as well as from the judgment, brings all
the evidence up for review at the General Term. There can be no •
doubt of the right of that tribunal to review and reverse a verdict
which, upon due examination, appears to have been influenced by
passion or prejudice, or one that is clearly against the weight of evidence: Macy v. W'heeler, 30 N. Y. 237; Courtney v. Baker, 60
Id. 6; Boos v. World MutualLife Ins. Co., 64 Id. 242. But such
an appeal should be addressed to sound discretion and an unmistakable conclusion upon the facts as found. We are called upon to
deal with the validity of a marriage affecting rights of property
within the state. If it shall appear that the findings of the jury
support the existence of such a contract, and the various exceptions
in the case are shown to be untenable, then the judgment appealed
from must be affirmed.
The question, what constitutes a legal marriage, is always
important, and often difficult to answer. The peculiar nature and
sacredness of the relation, the delicate interests involved, and the
grave responsibilities depending upon it, invite and demand the
most careful judicial scrutiny and discrimination.
Elementary writers have busied themselves with the discussion
whether the marriage relation was a mere contract or a status.
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But legislatures have prescribed the essentials, and courts of law
have pronounced upon the validity of that relation. Necessarily,
then, where independent sovereignties differ, diversity of authority
upon this subject must exist. In our own country we often find a
marriage valid in one state unrecognised in another.
What then is to govern where authorities conflict ? Shall it be
the. lex damicilii,the lex contractu8, or the lex loci rei gice P
Judge STORY appears to have regarded marriage as "an institution of society, and not merely a contract which the parties thereto
might dissolve at pleasure." This would seem to be the naturally
reasonable and moral aspect of such a relation. But, nevertheless,
the authorities in this state point to the conclusion that marriage is
nothing more or less than a civil contract.
We come then to the consideration of the alleged marriage between
the parties as shown by the testimony. It is not claimed that its
validity has been established in accordance with the law of England;
but the proposition is urged that the reiteration of the marriage
vow on the British Channel, and in France, solemnized an act which
it was the intention of the parties to consummate.
The testimony of Mrs. Hynes is unimpeached. The jury believed
it, and an appellant court, in the absence of gross error or mistake,
should hesitate to disregard their findings.
It is apparent then, if we are to accept the testimony produced
and the verdict rendered, that it was the intention of the parties to
enter into the marriage relation. That such relation was followed
by its recognition by the deceased, cohabitation and birth of offspring
is beyond dispute; and we are now asked, as against the weight of
evidence, to reverse the judgment rendered. The facts thus established invoke the old rule of law "semper prxeumuntur pro Matrimonjo," and the burden of proof is thus cast upon the defendants.
What have they offered to disprove this fact of marriage?
A registry of births with which Mrs. Hynes is not shown to have
been connected, and an offer of proof of a lease of premises taken
in her former name of Saunders, which she failed to identify.
The jury have found, as above shown, that Win. R. Hynes, at the
time of his alleged contract of marriage, was a citizen of the state
of New York, and temporarily sojourning in London; and that the
parties to said contract entered into the same with the intention of
returning to and residing in the state of New York'
Mr Hynes owned property in the city of New York, that be
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once resiaed here is undisputed, and I cannot, confronted by the
verdict of the jury, hold that he was not a resident of this state at
the time of his alleged marriage.
This court is a record as to a marriage of this character per verba
de prmsenti: Davis v. Davis, 7 Daly 308 ; and the same theoly is
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Meister v.
Moore, 6 Otto 76.
Conceding, however, for the purpose of argument, the invalidity
of the marriage in England, that upon the English Channel and
the subsequent one in France next claim attention.
There was no proof of the nationality of the vessel in which parties sailed and the court cannot indulge in inferences upon this
point: Piers v. Piers, 2 H1. L. Cas. 331; Morris v. Davis, 5 Cl.
& Fin. 163; Bishop on Mar. and Div. 457.
Assuming, then, as the verdict of the jury warrants, that the
parties, who were able to contract, did contract a marriage with a
view to a future residence in the state of New York, of which one
of the contracting parties has been found to have been a resident,
the presumption is in favor of the validity of the marriage: Clayton v. TFardell, 4 N. Y. 230; Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 Id. 90;
Bissell v. Bissell, 55 Barb. 325.
The testimony offered to prove the French law as to marriage did
not meet the requirements of our statute. It demands that the
authenticity of a foreign statute be established.
The testimony of Michael Rey (the witness called for that purpose), showed that he had not been in France since 1859, and the
code of law produced was published subsequent to his departure
from that country; moreover, the witness testified that there were
codes of the French law edited or published by Seriat, Rogron, and
by a great many other people (fo. 668.) What reliability can be
placed upon such testimony? Does it establish as a fact what the
law of France was when this marriage was alleged to have been
contracted? Clearly not. Since 1859 that law may have been
repealed, modified or so amended as to embrace the legality of the
marriage in question. The defendants were bound to establish
affirmatively what the law of France was at the time of this
marriage.
I find no error in the refusal of the judge at trial to admit the
testimony of the witness Loader in relation to a comparison of the
handwriting of Mrs. Hynes. The rule is well settled that signa-
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tures cannot be shown in evidence merely for the purpose of comparison, but only when the instrument to which they are affixed has
been offered in proof of some other fact: Whart. on Ev., § 712,
713; Van Wyck v. McInto8h, 14 N. Y. 439; Moore v. United
States, 1 Otto 270.
I have reviewed the several exceptions in this case and find no
substantial error in the rulings, it was tried upon the theory that
a citizen of this state, temporarily sojourning abroad, should, so far
as property in this state is concerned, be held to the consequences
of his own act. The jury having found affirmatively on all the dis.
tinctive facts at issue, and no error of record appearing, the order
and judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs.
VAN BRUNT, J.-The rule seems to be well settled that the
validity of a marriage is to be determined by the lex loci contractus.
So well recognised had this rule become, that Congress in 1860
found it necessary to pass an act in relation to the marriage of
American citizens in foreign countries.
American citizens had been in the habit of entering into marriage
contracts at the various consulates, according to the law of their
domicile, under the supposition that, as the consulate was under the
American flag, the contract was to be deemed to have been entered
into upon American soil, and therefore valid, and to be governed by
the lex domicilii,no matter what might be the law regulating marriage
of the country in which the consulate was situate.
This position, however, being recognised as entirely false, and
that the lex loci determined the validity of such marriage, Congress,
in 1860, passed an act providing that marriage, in the presence
of any consulate officer of the United States, between persons who
would be authorized to marry, if residing in the District of Columbia, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, and shall have the
same effect as if so solemnized within the United States.
It is true that decisions may be found applying the. lex domicilit
to such contracts, but in every such case the recognised rule of law
has been pbt aside because of the hardship which it would work in
that particular ease.
The marriage in the case at bar which is alleged to have been
entered into in London would seem to be void.
As to the marriage entered into upon the packet running between
Dover and Calais, it would, it seems to me, to be a violent presumption to suppose that the vessel carried the American flag. The
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vessel appears to have been one plying betweenDover, an English
port, and Calais, a French port, only twenty-one miles distant.
The marriage, which the jury found was entered into in France,
was not a ceremonial marriage, but an agreement of marriage entered into per verba deprcesenti.
Such a marriage is valid according to the laws of the state of New
York and to the common and civil law, and as there was no competent evidence given as to what the law of marriage is in France, as is
shown by Judge LARREMORE'S opinion, the presumption is that the
law of France is either the same as that of the state of New York,
or the common or civil law; and as the marriage contract found by
the jury to have been entered into in France is valid by either of
these laws, such marriage must be held by the courts of this state
to be valid.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
This case differs materially from Sttomayer v. DB Barros, ante, p. 76, and

indeed in many respects it is the converse of the latter, which, as presented
to the English Court of Appeal, in Law
Rep. 3 Prob. Div. 1, was that of a marriage prohibited by the lex domicilii of
Portugal, except under the sanction of
a Papal dispensation, which had not
been obtained, both parties to the contract
being subjects of Portugal and, as was
supposed at the time, both being domiciled in Portugal. Under these circumstances the Court of Appeal decided
that the ler domiciIii must prevail, although all the requirements of the lex
loci were complied with, and such a marriage was not per se prohibited in England. p~pon a subsequent investigation
the. facts were modified to the extent that
only one of the contracting parties, viz.,
the man, was domiciled in Portugal, the
other being domiciled in England; and
the case being re-opened in the court below, Sir J. HAxNEN (Judge of the Court
for Matrimonial causes), decided that the
lez loci must govern the ease. Sir R.
PrH .r.r.o a, the other judge of the same
couri, had previously given his decision
to the same effect, under the impression
that both parties were domiciled in a foreign country. It was from his (Sir R.

P mnoRE's) decision that the appeal,
reversing his judgment, was taken. In
a previous number of the Law Register,
ante, p. 76, we have fully discussed the
case of Sottomayorv. De Barros. In the
present case the man was a citizen of
the United States, the woman being a
British subject domiciled in England.
Mr. Hynes, on the other hand, though
temporarily resident in England, was domiciled in New York, where marriages
per verba de prasenti,without the intervention of a person in holy orders, are
legal. A marriage of that description
between these parties had taken place in
England; had been renewed on board
ship in crossing the British channel to
France, and again renewed in France, at
least by repeated acknowledgments to
friends and acquaintances, accompanied
by cohabitation.
Such a marriage has teen by the Court
of Common Pleas in General Term of
New York to be a valid marriage in the
state of New York. Whether such would
be held good in England and France, or
in either, remains yet to be decided. The
whole of the property in this case being
situated in the United States it will be
unnecessary to make such inquiry. But
were it otherwise we might possibly witness the unseemly result of a marriage
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dkemea good in the United States, yet
adjudged invalid in other countries ; a
right to dower, indefeasible on this side
the Atlantic, repudiated on the other ;
children legitimate in one country, but
illegitimate in others. We are far, however, from prejudging a case that may
yet arise. Marriages per verba de presenti have never been absolutely abolished
in England, though celebration of such
cannot be enforced by any ecclesiastical
or matrimonial court: 20 Geo. 2, c. 33,
,. 13; The Queen v. Millis, 10 Cl. &
Fin. 841. It was insisted that even in such
marriages the presence of a priest in holy
oders, under some ancient Saxon canons of King Edmund (A. D. 940), bad
always been an essential requisite. Such
canons, even obsolete in England, where
ever since the Reformation a deacon, and
not a mass priest, which these canons required, has been in practice allowed to
officiate, were never imported into the
American colonies, where the common
law of England prevails, unless specially
abrogated by state legislation; therefore
the lex domicilii, the simplest form of
marriage by words of present import and
intent, even without the presence of witnesses, must if accepted at all by the foreign judicature, be accepted unshackled.
The mere want of witnesses, remarked
Mr. Justice WILLEs, in Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas. 308, never invalidated a marriage, "that created a difficulty of proof only, and did not affect its
validity."
In The Queen v. Millis, before referred to, Lord BrouGHAx said, in the
course of his opinion, "It is clear that
by the universal law of Europe before the
Council of Trent this contract could be
validly solemnized by the parties consenting to take each other for man and wife
without the intervention of the sacerdotal
office or the presence of any one in holy
orders. The Council of Trent required,
and for the first time required, the marriage to be in the presence of a priest.
But the Council of Trent never was reVor. XXVIII.-29

ceived or acknowledged in Englaud. But
if the Council of Trent never was recognised in England, have we not a right to
fall back upon the common and universal
law of Europe as our own in this impor.tant matter ?" Certainly the decrees of
the Council of Trent were never received
in America any more than were the Saxon
canons of King Edmund. The stat. of
4 Geo. 4, c. 76, annuls all marriages not
solemnized in accordance with its provisions if the parties do so wilfully and
knowingly. To say nothing of the difficulty of proving wilfulness and knowledge
of the national marriage law, on the part
of a foreigner, can such a statute bind
other than the subjects of the country to
which it relates, in the face of the assurance of Lord Chief Justice TiNDAL, in
The Queen v. Millis, that "these contracts (perverba de prosentiand per verba
de futuro cum copuld) are still lawful,
though they cannot be enforced in any
ecclesiastical court." And again, Chief
Justice Gins, in Lautour v. Teesdale, 8
Taunt. 837, says, after citing authorities
quoted by Sir W. SCOTT (Lord STOWELL) in Dalrymple v. Da ymple, Hagg.
Coast. R. 54: "It appears that a contract of marriage per verba de pressenti is
considered to be an actual marriage,
though doubts have been entertained
whether it be so unless followed by cohabitation." But without further laboring this point the simple question involved
in boih Sottomayor v. De Barros and
Hynes v. McDermott was, is the le domieilii
to prevail over the lex loci, either
where both parties are foreigners domiciled at home, or where both being foreigners, only one is domiciled at home, or
where only one is a foreigner domiciled in
a foreign country, and the other a
subject of the state of the lex loci
and domiciled there? And further, if
the lex domicilii is to prevail in a case
where even the lex loci has been complied
with and where no prohibition exists in the
latter country, is it not in a fortiori case
the lex domicilii should prevail where it
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has formd the basis and evidence of the
contract, no prohibition existing in the
lex doinicilii, and no proof of wilfully or
knowingly evading the lez loci on the part
even of the natural born subject of the
country where such marriage contract .
was effected, such subject being the woman
who, if the contract be that of marriage
ipsofacto acquires her husband's domicile
and nationality? 33 & 34 Viet. c. 14,
s.l0, and Dig. 50,1. 37 ; Code xii.1. 13;
x. 40, 9. In a recent case before the
English High Court of Justice, Court
of Appeal, viz., Brittainv. Rossiter, 18
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 716, it was held,
that a verbal contract was not made
absolutely void by the Statute of Frauds,
s. 4, but was an existing contract, though
not enforceable. In that case BRETT, L.
J., said, "I think, on the true view of the
case, it is not right to say that the first
contract is void absolutely, because it is
within the Statute of Frauds. There is
a contract, but no person can be charged
upon it in a court of law." And further
on, he adds that in Leroux v. Brown, 12
C. B. 801, Junvis, C. J., and MLNuLE, J.
"gave a clear decision, that a contract,
made in words, which is within the 4th
section of the Statute of Frauds, is not
void, because it has not been reduced
into writing, but only that it cannot be
enforced, nor anything depending on it, in
any English court of law." Also, in the

in English court of law, but it s still
in existing contract. It can 40t be en
orced "nor anything depending on it."
"it is not void for all purposes."
But
I
Carringtonv. Roots, 2
IEt is true that in
1. & W. 248, Mr. Baron PARKE, said,
'the contract being void by the statute,
the action cannot be maintained." But

same case of appeal, COTTON, L. J., says,

"I am of opinion, that under the statute
the verbal contract was an existing contract, but was not enforceable."
TuESIGEu, L. J., confirms this view
when he says, "I think it is clear that
it is not void for all purposes, and it is a
real, existing contract though not enforceable." * ** "When a contract
is not enforceable within the Statute of
Frauds, it is still an existing contract."
These opinions are here cited to show
that a contract is not the less a contract
because the terms of a statute have not
been complied with. Such want of compliance may render it unenforceable in

as COTTON, L. J., in giving his opinion

in Brittaia v. Rossiter, explains'When he (Baron PARKE), says a
void' contract, he means it is not a contract that one party could, as a matter
of right, enforce against another." Now
marriage is not merely a contract but a
status. At least such is its English definition. The incidents of that status may
not be enforceable by English law for
want of compliance with a statute or
statutes, but if the contract is vertun matrimoniwn it nevertheless subsists.
The question that suggests itself in the
principal case, is as follows : Does the lez
domicilii form an exception to the rules
that govern the lex lociI Though
according to the lex loci such a contract
as we have been considering cannot be
enforced, yet being a contract springing
out of the lex domaicilii, do the English
Marriage Acts apply to it at all? If
the lex domiceilii is recognised by the
English courts in such a case, surely
the incidents of the status must attach.
It is granted that they would not if the
contract rested with the lex loci. Then
the contract, through the operation of
the Marriage Act, would, like a contract
within the Statute of Frauds, not be enforceable. This question cannot remain
long undecided.

Sir J. HANNEX seems

to think that a marriage effected in England between persons domiciled elsewhere, must nevertheless be judged by
the lex loci. The Lords Justices of Appeal, in the same case (Sotomayor v. DeBarros), appear to be of a contrary
opinion, at least where such marriages
are prolhbited by the lex domicilii. Then
why not where they are permitted by the
lex domiciii t Sir J. HA nxi, in his
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luminous judgment, seems to be of opin- of ships sailing under its flag, is that some
ion that it would be impossible for the entry in the log should be made of any
English courts to constitute themselves such transaction, and this is done by the
judges of the lex domieilii of every coun- English Merchant Shipping Act (1854)
try. The lex loci is their only guide. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 282, as follows,
Thus the matter rests for the present, as "every master of a ship for which an
far as the Sottomayor v. DeBarros Case official log-book is hereby required, shall
is concerned.
make or cause to be made therein entries
Before concluding it is well to observe of the following matters (that is to say)"
that it is now settled, that by the law of inter alia "every marriage taking place
England the lex domicili and not the ler on board, with the names and ages of
loci rei sita governs the distribution of the parties."
and succession to personal property in
But this is merely directory, and the
intestacy or testacy: Somerville v. Szom- master may possibly forfeit his certificate
erville, 5 Ves. 754; Gambier v. Gam- for neglect of this duty. But as we have
bier, 7 Sim. 263, and numerous other seen, want of witnesses never invalidated
cases. Also the liability to succession a marriage (Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L.
duty, which relates to real estate: Calla- Cas. 308), and as the only description of
nanev. Campbell,24 Law Times R. (N. marriage that can be affected on board
S.) 175. M. R. The law of the domi- ship, for want of any special jarisdiction,
cile
of origin must yield to that of the is a common or rather universal law marsitus of real property, or to that of the ,riage, where no witnesses are oecessary,
domicile of thedeceased, according to the the master might well be in ignerance of
nature of the property which is the sub- the proceeding. This is tacitly admitted
ject of litigation: I Burge on Foreign by the statute just quoted, as merchant.
Law, pp. 111, 112. These rules have ships are not in the habit of carrying chapan important bearing on the legitimacy lains, neither are churches, chapels, regisor illegitimacy of children, dependent trars' offices, nor registrars to be found or
upon the respective laws of different coun- board, and yet the possibility of marriages
tries on the validity of marriages, or the there taking place, is evidently contemeffect, for instance, of subsequent matri- plated by the statute. The same obser
monium on ante nati children.
rations apply to ships of all nations.
In a message (December 7th 1875) of whatever rules prevail for the convenient
President Grant to Congress, attention authentication of the contract.
was called to the necessity Of legislation
The flag or nationality cannot on the
concerning the marriages of American high seas control the common or civil
citizens, contracted abroad, and concern- law of Christendom.
ing the status of American women who
It only remains to remark that there
may marry foreigners and of children being no proof before the court, in the
born of American parents in a foreign .Hynes's Case, of the state of the marcountry.
riage law in France, the ancient univerThe only other point to be considered sal law of Europe must be presumed
in the Hynes's case, is the effect of a still to prevail in that country, at least
marriage per verba de prasention board as far as foreigners are concerned.
ship. Now " the high seas," says Philli- Neither is this a violent presumption, as
more, p. 377, are not subject to the it is matter of history that the decrees
jurisdiction of any state," and no mar- of the Council of Trent were never reriage laws of any particular state, can ceived in France, although an ordinance
have any extra-territorial jurisdiction. of Blois, supplemented by a declaration
The utmost that any nation can require of Louis XIII. (A. D. 1639), was is-
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sued to a similar effect. But this ordinance and declaration were swept away
with the monarchy, by the tide of the
great French Revolution, and in a country so prolific of revolutions, it is difficult to predicate from the past the existence of any particular law at the present.
Indeed we believe that at one period
of French Revolutionary history, the
only mode of contracting marriages was
per verba de prasenti, and that all religions ceremonial was expressly forbidden
by law, or at least was rendered impossible by the repudiation of Christianity,
itself, and that no civil record of such
marriage contracts was established even
for the purpose of legal authentication.
At all events the lack of proof in the
case before us, of the present state of
the French law precludes the necessity
of any further inquiry in that direction,
and upon this view the court appears to
have acted in forming its opinion.
An opinion expressed by Lord Chief
Justice CocKBunm, in his interesting
tract on "Nationality," published by
Ridgway, London, that "it is quite pos-

sible for a person to have two donu
c'ies," might tend to further complicate
such cases as the present, were it not
that his lordship appears to be confounding residence with domicile. A man
undoubtedly may have many residences
in different countries, and though, in
common parlance,they may all be spoken
of as domiciles, yet as the Master of the
Rolls observed in Somervillev. Somerville,
supra, the court had to decide "which of
the two domiciles should preponderate,
or rather, which is the domicile according
to which the personal estate shall be regulated." In the words of Chancellor
KEwT, "a man can have but one domicile
for the purpose of succession." Kent's
Com., L 37, s. 41 note.
With all due deference to such an authority as Lord Chief Justice CocKnumi,
he can scarcely be taken as speaking
judicially in the sentence above quoted,
and we only refer to it, lest it should
mislead in construing "domicile" in its
technical and not merely conventional
sense.

HUGH WEIaGTNe.

Supreme Court of the United States.
NATIONAL SAVINGS BANK OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
v. WILLIAM H. WARD.
Attorneys employed to examine the title to real estate, whether in view of a conveyance or of a security for money to be loaned, impliedly contract with their employer to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of the undertaking.
When a person adopts the legal profession and assumes to exercise its duties in
behalf of another for hire, he must be understood as promising to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of such duties, and if injury results
to the client from the want of such care and skill, the attorney may be held to respond in damages to his client for the injury sustained.
Persons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings, by
authority or request of clients, must be regarded in the capacity of attorneys at law
within the above rules.
Where there is neither fraud, falsehood nor collusion, the obligation of the attorney to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of the designated
service is to the client and not to a third party, the rule being that the attorney,
where no such wrongful elements exist, is not liable for the want of reasonable care
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and skill at the suit of any one between whom and himself the relation of attorney
and client does not in some manner exist.
Cases where fraud and collusion are alleged and proved, constitute a well-recognized exception to the general rule, but where the cause of action consists merely
in the charge of the want of reasonable care and skill in the performance of a professional duty, the attorney is only liable to his client.
Actions for negligence, where the act of negligence imputed is one immediately
dangerous to the lives of others, such as apothecaries who compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a poison as a harmless medicine and send it so labelled
into the market, or surgeons who treat a patient unskilfully, stand upon a different
footing, and the rule in such cases is, that the wrongdoer may be liable to the injured party, whether there be any privity of contract between them or not.
But where the wrongful act is not of a dangerous character, and was not performed pursuant to a legal duty, the negligent party is, in general, liable only to the
person with whom he contracted, and upon the ground that negligence is a breach
of the contract.
Usage will not make a contract where none was made by the parties.

THIS was an action by the plaintiffs against the defendant upon
the ground that they retained and employed him to examine and
ascertain the title of the possessor of the premises described in
the declaration, and to report to them the nature and extent of his
title to the same, and they alleged that he, the defendant, accepted
the employment and reported to them that the title of the possessor
of the premises was good and unencumbered; that they procured
that report with a view to the making of a loan, and that upon
the faith and credit of it, they loaned the sum of $3500 to the pretended owner of the premises, and accepted as security for the same
a trust deed of the property, whereas the borrower of the money
was insolvent and had no title whatever to the premises, as fully
and explicity appeared by a prior deed of conveyance duly recorded. The further facts appear in the opinion.
Process was duly served and the defendant appeared and pleaded
the general issue, which was duly joined by the plaintiffs. Continuance followed and at the opening of the next term the parties
went to trial, and the verdict and judgment were in favor of the
defendant. Exceptions were filed by the plaintiffs and they sued
out the present writ of error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-Attorneys employed by the purchasers of real
property, to investigate the title of the grantor prior to the purchase, impliedly contract to exercise reasonable care and skill in
the performance of the undertaking, and if they are negligent or
fail to exercise such reasonable care and skill in the discharge of
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the stipulated service, they are responsible to their employers for
the loss occasioned by such neglect or want of care and skill: Add
Con., 6th ed., 615.
Like care and skill are also required of attorneys when employed
to investigate titles to real estate, to ascertain whether it is a safe
or sufficient security for a loan of money, the rule being that if the
attorney is negligent or fails to exercise reasonable care and skill in
the performance of the service, and a loss results to his employers
frm such neglect or want of care and skill, he shall be responsible
to them for the consequences of such loss: Add. Torts, Wood's ed.,
615.
Six errors are assigned, of which three will be separately examined.
They are as follows: (1) That the court erred in ruling that
some piivity of contract, arising from an actual employment of the
defendant by the plaintiffs, is necessary to enable the latter to maintain the action. (2) That the court erred in holding that the evidence introduced did not establish such a privity of contract between
the parties as entitled the plaintiffs to recover. (3) That the court
erred in instructing the jury that upon the whole evidence the
verdict should be for the defendant.
Evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs tending to prove that
the defendant is an attorney at law doing business in the city, and
that he held himself out to the public as a person skilled in the
examination of titles to real estate situated in the district. That
the claimant of the lot described in the transcript employed the
defendant, in his professional character, to examine his title to that
lot and to report to him the condition of the same, and that the
defendant, pursuant to that employment, reported to his employer
that his title to the lot is good and that the property is unencumbered, the report being signed by the defendant and his son.
It is not pretended by the plaintiffs that they ever employed the
defendant to examine -the title to the lot, and it appears that the
report was made at the sole request of the claimant of the lot,
without any knowledge on the part of the defendant as to the purpose for which it was obtained. All that is conceded by the plaintiffs, but they gave evidence to show that the claimant of the lot
presented the certificate to certain brokers and employed them to
negotiate a loan upon the property in his favor for $3500, on the
faith of that certificate. Detailed statement is given in the transcript of the steps taken by the brokers to obtain the required loan,
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the substance of which is that they required the party to give a
negotiable note for the amount, payable in one year, with ten per
cent. interest, and that he and his wife should execute a trust deed
of the lot to them as trustees to secure the payment of the note
when due.
Preliminaries being arranged the brokers applied to the plaintiffs
for the loan and obtained the same, giving the note and deed of
trust with the certificate as security for the payment. Before
accepting the papers the plaintiffs, through their agent, required
the brokers to sign the name of the borrower to the formal application for the loan, as exhibited in the transcript, and that the certificate as to the title should be continued to the date of the transaction.
Throughout the negotiation for the loan was conducted entirely
by the brokers with the plaintiffs, and it was the borrower who
procured the second certificate from the defendant, the evidence
showing that the defendant never came in contact either with the
plaintiffs or the brokers.
Payment of the note was not made at maturity, and when it was
attempted to sell the premises under the trust deed, it was discovered
that the certificates were untrue, and that the grantors, on the 13th
of March previous, had conveyed the premises in fee-simple by deed
duly executed and recorded.
Attorneys at law are officers of the court, admitted as such by its
order, but it is a mistake to suppose that they are officers of the
United States, as they are neither elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution for the election or appointment
of such officers : .Ex parte Garland,4 Wall. 333, 378.
When a person adopts the legal profession and assumes to exercise
its duties in behalf of another for hire, he must be understood as
promising to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill in the
performance of such duties, and if injury results to the client from
a want of such a degree of reasonable care and skill, the attorney
may be held to respond in damages to the extent of the injury sustained. Proof of employment and the want of reasonable care and
skill are prerequisites to the maintenance of the action, but it must
not be understood that an attorney is liable for every mistake that
may occur in practice, or that he may be held responsible to his
client for every error of judgment in the conduct of his client's
cause. Instead of that the rule is that if he acts with a proper
degree of skill and with reasonable care and to the best of his
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knowledge he will not be held responsible: Bowman v. Tallman, 27
How. Pr. R. 212, 274.
If he fails in any of these respects he may, and sometimes does
not only forfeit all claim for compensation but may also render himself liable to his client for any damage he may sustain from such
neglect. Such liabilities frequently arise, and an attorney may also
be liable to his client for the consequences of his want of reasonable
care or skill in matters not in litigation. Business men not infrequently seek legal advice in making or receiving conveyances of real
property, and it is well settled that an attorney may be liable to his
client for negligence or want of reasonable care and skill in examining titles in such cases, whether the error occurs in respect to the
title of property purchased or in the covenants in the instrument of
conveyance, where the property is sold.
Where the relation of attorney and client exists there is seldom
any serious difficulty in determining whether the client has or has
not a cause of action, or its nature and extent if one exists. Criterions of standard character are established in legal decisions by
which every such controversy may be determined.
But in the case before the court the defendant was never retained or employed by the plaintiffs, nor did they ever pay him
anything for making the certificates, nor did he evei perform any
service at their request or in their behalf.
Neither fraud nor collusion is alleged or proved, and it is conceded that the certificates were made by the defendant at the request
of the applicant for the loan, without any knowledge on the part of
the defendant what use was to be made of the same or to whom they
were to be presented. None of those matters are controverted, but
the plaintiffs contend that an attorney in such a case is liable to the
immediate sufferer for negligence in the examination of such a title,
although he, the sufferer, did not employ the defendant, and the
case shows that the service was performed for a third person without
any knowledge that the certificate was to be used to procure a loan
from the injured party.
Persons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations, or
proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients, may be
regarded as attorneys at law within the meaning of that designation
as used in this country, and all such, when they undertake to conduct legal controversies or transactions, profess themselves to be
reasonably well acquainted with the law and the rules and practice
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of the courts, and they are bound to exercise in such proceedings a
reasonable degree of care, prudence, diligence and skill. Authorities everywhere support that proposition, but attorneys do not profess to know all the law or to be incapable of error or mistake in
applying it to the facts of every case, as even the most skilful of
the profession would hardly be able to come up to that standard.
Unless the client is injured by the deficiencies of his attorney he
cannot maintain any action for damages, but if he is injured the
true ruie is that the attorney is liable for the want of such skill,
care and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in such matters of professional employment.
Both parties concur in these suggestions, but the defendant insists
that in order that such a liability may arise there must be some privity of contract between the parties to enable the plaintiffs to maintain the action; that inasmuch as the defendant was never retained
or employed by the plaintiffs and never rendered any service at their
request or in their behalf, he cannot be held liable to them for any
negligence or want of reasonable care, skill, or diligence in giving
to a third party the certificates in question.
Beyond all doubt the general rule is that the obligation of the
attorney is to his client and not to a third party, and unless there
is something in the circumstances of this case to take it out of that
general rule, it seems clear that the proposition of the defendant
must be sustained: Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, sect.
215. Conclusive support to that rule is found in several cases of
high authority: Fish v. Kelly, 17 0. B. N. S. 194.
Argument to show that the direct question was irvalved in that
case is unnecessary, as the affirmative of the propc&ition sufficiently
appears in the head-note, which is as follows: That an attorney is
not liable to an action for negligence, at the suit of one between
whom and himself the relation of attorney and client does not exist,
for giving in answer to a casual inquiry, erroneous information as
to the contents of the deed.
Although the inquiry was addressed directly to the defendant,
and the case shows that the answer was given to the person making
it, the court held, ERLE, C. J., giving the opinion, that there was
no relation between the parties from which any contract could be
inplied, nor any relation between the parties from which any duty
could arise. Mention is then made of the fact that the defendant
was the solicitor of the trustees of a certain estate, and that the
VoL. xxVIII.-30
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plaintiff was a workman in the employ of the trustees, from which
the court deduced the conclusion that the parties did not stand in
such a relation to each other as to make it any part of the duty of
the defendant to give the plaintiff any professional advice. His
answer was entirely erroneous, but the court decided that he could
not be held responsible, unless it could be shown that at the time he
made it he knew it to be false.
Sufficient appears even in that case alone to show that the ruling
of the subordinate court is correct, but it is a mistake to suppose
that the proposition is without other support than what is derived
from the reasons there assigned for the conclusion. Prior to that
the same question was decided by the highest court of the same
country in the same way. Application to an insurance company
was made by a certain party for a loan of money, which the company agreed to make if the party would insure his life and assign
to them the policy and give sureties for the payment of interest on
the loan. It appears that the plaintiffs became sureties for the
applicant, and that the defendant, a law agent employed by the
principal who applied for the loan, drew up the papers in the transaction, among which was one intended for the security of the
sureties, which proved to be incomplete. Loss was sustained by
the sureties and they brought suit against the law agent, charging
that the loss was occasioned by his negligence and want of skill
and other fault. Appearance was entered by the defendant, and
he denied the alleged employment. Judgment was rendered for
the plaintiffs in the lower court, and the defendant appealed to the
House of Lords, where the appeal was argued by very able counsel.
Opinions seriatim were delivered by the law lords. In substance
and effect Lord CAMPBELL said that he never had any doubt of the
unsoundness of the proposition that would maintain the action in
such a case, and added that there'must be a privity of contract
between the parties, which was not proved in that case.
No attempt was made by the appellee to controvert that proposition, but his counsel contended that the law of Scotland was
different; that by the law of the latter country a law agent in
respect of damage occasioned by his neglects, is responsible to
those who suffer by his default, although there may not have subsisted the relation of principal and agent between them. It was
Lord CRANWORTH who responded to that proposition, and in the
course of his judgment he commented upon all the authorities cited
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in support of the same, and showed that they failed to establish it.
Emphatic concurrence in the conclusion announced by the chancellor was expressed by Lord WENSLEYDALE, to the effect following: that "he only who, by himself or another as his agent,
employs the attorney to do the particular act in which the alleged
neglect has taken place can sue him for that neglect, and that mployment must be affirmed in the declaration of the suit in distinct
terms. By the law of England the right of action depends entirely
upon the question between whom the relation of principal and agent,
client and attorney subsists." Nothing more decisive of the question need be sought; and we have the authority of that great
magistrate to say that it is impossible to support by a single case in
that country so extraordinary a proposition as that persons who
were not, by themselves or their agents, employers of law agents to
do an act, could have remedy against such agents for the negligent
performance of it.
Speaking to the same point, Lord CHELMSFORD said, it is clear
that this general proposition, abstracted from the facts of the case,
cannot be maintained to its full extent, as it would apply to cases
where there is no privity of contract between the parties, when it
is conceded that no liability would arise: Bobertson v. Fleming,
4 Macq. H. of L. Cas. 167, 209.
Analogous cases involving the same principle are quite numerous,
a few of which only will be noticed. They show to a demonstration
that it is not every one who suffers a loss from the negligence of
another, that can maintain a suit on such grounds. On the contrary, the limit of the doctrine relating to actionable negligence,
says BEASLEY, 0. J., is that the person occasioning the loss must
owe a duty, arising from contract or otherwise, to the person sustaining such loss. Such a restriction on the right to sue, for a
want of care in the exercise of employment or the transaction of
business, is plainly necessary to restrain the remedy from being
pushed to an impracticable extreme. There would be no bounds
to actions and litigious intricacies, if the illeffects of the negligence of men may be followed down the chain of results to the
final effect: Kahl v. Love, 37 N. J. Law 5, 8.
Injury was received by the driver of a mail-coach which broke
down from defects in its construction. He brought suit against the
constructor of the coach, who sold the same to the owner of the
line, in whose employment the plaintiff was engaged when the acci-
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dent happened. Held by the whole court that the action would
not lie, as there is no privity of contract between the parties.
Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this, to the
parties who entered into them, said Lord ABINGER,-the most absurd
consequences, to which no limit can be seen, will ensue; and Baron
ALDERSON remarked, if we hold that- the plaintiff can sue in such
a case there is no point at which such actions will stop. The only
safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into
the contract; if we go one step beyond that there is no reason why
we should not go fifty: Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. &. W.
109, 115.
Cases where fraud and collusion are alleged and proved constitute exceptions to that rule, and PARKE, B., very properly admits
in the following case, that other exceptions to it exist, which are as
sound in principle as the judgments which establish the rule: Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 W. H. & G. 761-767.
Examples of the kind are given in that case, two of which deserve to be noticed, as they have been urged in argument to disprove the rule, but they cannot have any such effect, for the plain
reason that they stand in many respects upon a different footing.
These cases, say the court in that opinion, occur where there has
been a wrong done to the person, for which he would have a right
of action, though no such contract had been made, and the court
gives as an illustration the patient injured by improper medicines
prepared by an apothecary, or one unskilfully treated by a surgeon,
where both would be liable to the injured party, even if the father
or friend of the patient contracted with the wrongdoer. Reported
cases of the kind are cited by the plaintiffs, but it is obvious that
they have no proper application to the case before the court: Pipin v. Sheppard, 11 Price 400; Gladwell v. Steggall, 5 Bing.
(N. C.) 783; George v. Skivington, Law Rep. 5 Exch. 1; Bailway v. Derby, 14 How. 484.
Many judicial decisions in this country beside those cited, also
adopt the same rule and fully recognise the same class of exceptions.

Pharmacists or apothecaries who compound or sell medicines, if
they carelessly label a poison as a harmless medicine, and send it so
labelled into the market, are liable to all persons who, without fault
on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine, in consequence of the false label; the rule being that the liability in such
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a case arises not out of any contract or direct privity between the
wrongdoer and the person injured, but out of the duty which the
law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to
the lives of others. He is liable, therefore, though the poisonous
drug with the label may have passed through many intermediate
sales before it reached the hands of the person injured: Thomas v.
Winchester, 2 Seld. 397, 410.
Such an act of negligence being imminently dangerous to -the
lives of others, the wrongdoer is liable to the injured party whether
there be any contract between them or not. Where the wrongful
act is not immediately dangerous to the lives of others, the negligent party, unless he be a public agent in the performance of some
duty, is in general, liable only to the party with whom he contracted, and on the ground that negligence is a breach of the contract: Collis v. Selden, Law Rep., 3 C. P. 496.
Builders of a public work are answerable only to their employers
for any want of reasonable care and skill in executing their contract,
and they are not liable to third persons for accidents or injuries
which may happen to them from imperfections of the structure after
the same is completed and has been accepted by the employers:

fayor of Albany v. Cunlff, 2 Comst. 105, 174.
Misfortune to third persons not parties to the contract would not
be a natural and necessary consequence of the builder's negligence,
and such negligence is not an act imminently dangerous to human
life: Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351-358.
So where the manufacturer of a steam-boiler sold it to a paper company, it was held that the seller was only liable to the purchaser
for defective materials or for want of care and skill in its construc-tion, and if after delivery to, and acceptance by, the purchaser, and
while in use by him an explosion occurs in consequence of such defective construction, to the injury of third persons, the latter will
have no cause of action against the manufacturer: Losee v. Clute,
51 Id. 494-496.
Exactly the same rule prevails in the state of Pennsylvania, independent of any statutory regulation upon the subject, the Supreme
Court of the state holding that the liability of the Recorder of
Deeds, in a case almost identical with the present, is to the party
who asks and pays for the certificate, and not to his assigns or
alienee: Houseman v. Building and Loan Association, 81 Penn
St. 256, 262.
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Satisfactory proof is exhibited that the defendant was duly employed by the pretended owner of the lot to examine his title to the
same, and it is conceded that he did so, or that his son made the
search for him, and that he made and signed the certificates in question, and that he was paid for his services by his employer; nor is
it questioned that the title was defective as alleged. Concede that
and it follows as an implication of law that the defendant assumed
to possess the requisite knowledge and experience to perform the
stipulated service, and that he contracted with his employer that he
would use reasonable care and skill in the performance of the duties.
For a failure in either of these respects, if it resulted in damage to
his employer, he, the employer, is entitled to recover compensation:
Chase v. Hfeaney, 70 Ill. 268.
Decisions of the courts of the highest authority support that proposition, but the difficulty in the way of the plaintiffs is that they
never employed the defendant to search the records, examine the
title, or make the report, and it clearly appears that he never performed any such service at their request or in their behalf, and that
they never paid him anything for the service he did perform in
respect to that transaction; nor is there any evidence tending to
show any privity of contract between them and the defendant
within the meaning of the lawas expounded by the decisions of the
court.

Every imputation of fraud is disclaimed, and it is clear that the
transaction is not one immediately dangerous to the lives of others.
Where there is fraud or collusion the party will be held liable, even
though there is no privity of contract, but where there is neither
fraud or collusion nor privity of contract the party will not be held
liable, unless the act is one imminently dangerous to the lives of
others or is an act performed in pursuance of some legal duty:
Langridge v. Levy, 2 Mee. & Wels. 519, 530.
We agree said Lord DENMAN, C. J., and affirm the judgment,
on the ground stated by PARKE, B., that as there is fraud and damage the result of that fraud, not from an act remote and consequential, but one contemplated by the defendant at the time as one of
the results, the party guilty of the fraud is responsible to the party
injured: Levy v. Langridge, 4 Kees. & Wels. 338.
Abstracts of titles and certificates of the same are frequently if
not usually made by recorders, prothonotaries, or clerks, and in
eome states their liability is prescribed and regulated by statute:
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Laws of Pennsylvania 1872, 1140. By that act those officers are
declared liable for all loss or damage which may happen by reason
of any false or erroneous certificate of search, not only to the person
or persons to, for or upon whose order the said certificate of search
is made or given, but also to any person or persons claiming title
through, from, or under such person or persons, or who may suffer
loss by reason of the making or giving of any such false or erroneous
certificate. But it is unnecessary to enter into any discussion of
such regulations, as it is clear that there are none.such in this district which can have any application in this case.
Testimony was introduced at the trial tending to show that there
is a local usage in the district that the attorney examining the title
of such an applicant for a loan shall be considered as also acting for
the lendor of the money, and complaint is made that the court
below did not submit that evidence to the jury with proper instructions. Evidence of usage is not admissible to contradict or vary
what is clear and unambiguous, or to restrict or enlarge what
requires no explanation. Omissions may be supplied in some cases
by such proof, but it cannot prevail over or nullify the express provisions of the contract. So, where there is no contract, proof of
usage will not make one, and it can only be admitted either to
interpret the meaning of the language employed by the parties, or
where the meaning is equivocal or obscure: Tonipson v. Riggs, 5
Wall. 663, 679.
Suffice it to say these parties never met, and there was no communication of any kind between the defendant and the brokers, or
the lenders of the money. Nothing of the kind is pretended, the
only suggestion in that direction being that it may be held that the
applicant for the loan, when he employed the defendant, may be
regarded as the agent of the plaintiffs. Such suggestion being
entirely without evidence to support it, is entitled to no weight,
especially as it appears that the principal certificate was procured
several days before any interview upon the subject of the loan took
place between the brokers and the plaintiffs.
Jfudgment affirmed.

WAITE, C. J., dissenting.-I am unable to agree to the judgment
in this case. I think if a lawyer, employed to examine and certify
to the recorded title of real property, gives his client a certificate
which he knows or ought to know is to be used by the client in
some business transaction with another person as evidence of the
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facts certified to, he is liable to such other person relying on his
certificate for any loss resulting from his failure to find on record a
conveyance affecting the title, which, by the use of ordinary professional care and skill, he might have found. That, as it seems to
me, is this case. Ward was employed by Chapman to examine and
certify to the title to a certain lot in Washington. The circumstances were such as ought to have satisfied him that his certificate
was to be used by Chapman in some transaction with another person as evidence of the facts certified to. In examining the records
he overlooked a deed, in all respects properly recorded, which
showed on its face that Chapman had conveyed the lot away in feesimple, and certified as follows: "Lot 55, in Chapman's subdivision
of lots, in square 864. The title of Leonard S. Chapman to the
above lot is good, and the property is unencumbered. Win. R.
Ward." The National Savings Bank, relying on this certificate as
true, loaned Chapman $3500, taking for security a deed of trust of
the lot. It seems to me that under these circumstances Ward is
liable to the bank for any loss it may sustain by reason of his
erroneous certificate.
I am authorized to say that Justices SWAYNE and BRADLVT concur in this dissent.

Supreme Court of Yew Jersey.
TICHENOR v. HAYES,

ADMINISTRATRIX.

An action in tort-for negligence or deceit did not lie at common law against the personal representative of a deceased wrongdoer.
An action ex delicto was brought against the administratrix of a deceased attorney
at law for negligence in the discharge of his duty, and in some of the counts deceit
was charged: Held, that though the action was not sustainable at common law, it
would lie in New Jersey by force of the statute, that an action shall survive, when
any decedent has committed a trespass against the person or property of another.

DEMURRER to narr. The declaration contained six counts, that
related to two classes of transactions. The first class of counts
was founded on a breach of duty in the defendant's intestate,
arising out of an alleged retainer of such intestate, as an attorney
at law, by the plaintiff, in regard to certain mortgages about to be
purchased by the plaintiff, by means of which his money was lost.
The second class alleged that the plaintiff was induced, by the
deceitful and fraudulent misrepresentations of such intestate, to
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invest his money in the purchase of certain mortgages; that the
representations were false, and known to be so; and that the
plaintiff, relying on them, made the investments, which proved
worthless.
Alward
T.

.

Parrot,for the plaintiff.

. McCarter, for the demurrant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEASLEY, C. J.-This is a suit against an administratrix. Some
of the counts in the declaration, which is demurred tb, are founded
on a breach of duty in the defendant's intestate, as an attorney at
law, in investigating the title and condition, with respect to encumbrances, of a certain property upon which the plaintiff was about
to take a mortgage, and whereby the plaintiff lost the money
invested by him. The other counts allege, as the gravamen of the
action, certain false and fraudulent representations made by such
intestate with respect to certain mortgages, in consequence of which
the plaintiff put his money in them, and that such securities proved
worthless.
The demurrer that has been put n to this declaration is intended
to raise but a single question, which is, whether the causes of action
thus stated will survive against the personal representative of the
deceased wrongdoer.
The action as to form is in tort. I do not understand, from the
brief of the counsel of the defendant, that it is contended that if
the suit had been in the mode of an action ex contractufor the
non-performance of the implied contract that the attorney would
exercise due care and skill touching the business of his client, that
such action would not have survived. Upon this point the law is
settled by numerous decisions. In some of these the distinction,
with respect to the capacity to survive, that exists between the
forms of assumpait and tort, is sharply drawn. Such, in this
particular, is the aspect of Knights v. Quarles, 2 B. & B. 102,
which was a suit in assumpsit by an administrator, growing out of
an undertaking by the defendant, who was an attorney, to investigate and see that a title about to be conveyed to the intestate was a
good one, the breach being that the defendant failed to do so, and
that the intestate, in consequence, took an insufficient title, to the
injury of his personal estate. On these facts, the judicial opinion
was that such cause of action survived to the personal representative,
VoL. XXVIII.- 31
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such result being reached by the rules of the common law, irrespectively of any statutory modification. It was considered that
the whole transaction rested on a contract, and that a right to sue,
arising from a breach, passed to the administrator, and, in the
course of the opinion read on that occasion, it was observed, by way
of illustration, "that if a man contracted for a safe conveyance by
a coach, and sustained an injury by a fall, by which his means of
improving his personal property were destroyed, and that property
in consequence injured, though it was clear he in his lifetime might,
at his election, sue the coach proprietor in contract or in tort, it
could not be doubted that his executor might sue in assumpsit for
the coach proprietor's breach of contract."
This same distinction, in this respect, between these two forms
of action, is emphasized in several of the more recent decisions of
the English courts. One of these is the case of Bradghaw et ux. v.
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., Law Rep. 10 C. P. 189,
which was a suit ex contractuby an executrix for injuries inflicted
on the testator, in consequence of which, after an interval, he had
died, the purpose of the suit being to recover for medical expenses,
and the loss that had been occasioned by the inability of the testator
to attend to his business. The ground that was expressed for sustaining this action, which was admitted to be a novelty, was that all
that was claimed by the plaintiff was compensation for the loss that
had fallen on the personal estate, and, in form, the suit was for
breach of contract, and the doctrine, that there could be no recovery
at common law in such a proceeding, by reason of the suffering and
death of the person injured, was distinctly stated. Potter v. MetropolitanDistrict Railway Co., 30 L. T. (N. S.) 765, is a case of
the same complexion. And the old authorities are to the same effect,
as will conspicuously appear by a reference to the summary of them
appended, by way of a note, to the case of Wheatley v. Lane, I
Saund. 216, the two decisions from the law reports being specially
instanced by me, not on account of any novelty in the grounds of
judgment, but for the reason that they exemplify, with more than common distinctness, the limits to which an action on a contract will
survive. For it will be observed that these two cases, both in form
ex contractu, exclude from the recoverable damages all such as do
not fall under the denomination of losses to the personal estate.
This rule of decision accords with the principle adopted by this
court in the case of Hayden v. Vreeland, 8 Yroom 872, in which
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it was held that an action for a breach of a contract of marriage
could not be maintained by or against the personal representative
of either party to the contract.
Up to this point in my remarks on this subject, my object has
been to show that although at common law a certain class of actions
ex contractu are possessed of the capacity to survive to the personal representative, that nevertheless this transmissible remedy is
not a complete one; the importance of this circumstance will hereafter appear.
As has been already stated, the present action is in tort, in part
for fraud, and in part for a breach of the duty of an attorney at law
in not exercising due care and skill in the business of his client;
and it cannot, therefore, be doubted that, by the mere authority of
the common law, the proceeding cannot be vindicated.
Consequently, the only debatable question arising in this connection is
with respect to the proper construction of sections four and five of
the act concerning executors: Rev., p. 396.
These provisions are not strange to this court. They were considered and, in one of their aspects, construed in the case of Ten
Eyck v. Runk, 2 Vroom 428. That was an action for damages
caused to the plaintiff's land by water backed by the dam of the
defendant, and the point decided was that such action was not abated
by the death of the owner of the dam, but that it chould be continued against his executor. It was admitted in that case that such
cause of action would have been extinguished at the common law,
by force of the rule actio personalis moritur cum persona, and its
persistence after the death of the defendant was attributed altogether to the effect of the enactment just referred to. That enactment is in these words, viz. : "Where any testator or intestate
shall, in his or her lifetime, have taken or carried away, or converted to his or her use, the goods or chattels of any person or
persons, or shall, in his or her lifetime, have committed any trespass
to the person or property, real or personal, of any person or persons, such person or persons, his or her executors or administrators,
shall have and maintain the same action against the executors or
administrators of such testator or intestate as he, she or they might
have or had maintained against such testator or intestate."
In the case of Ten Eyck v. Runk, all that the court was called
upon to decide was whether the term "trespass" in this clause sig
nified those immediate wrongs that are remediable by the action of
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trespass vi et armis, or comprehended also those indirect injuries
resulting from a tortious act, the appropriate means of redress for
which is an action on the case, and the court put upon the expression this latter and more comprehensive interpretation. It is now
urged, in the argument of the counsel of the defendant, that while
it may be that the case just referred to was correctly ruled, that the
ground of judgment there adopted was too broad, and that, in the
language of the brief, "1the true construction of the act limits its
application to injury to specific property, real or personal, and not
to such a wrong as works no injury to any real or personal property
of the plaintiff, but causes his estate generally to sustain a loss."
But is this discrimination reasonable ? If, in the instance of water
thrown back on to the property of a person by a dam wrongfully
erected on the land of another, the word "trespass" in this act
means "tort" or "wrong," so as to embrace the consequential injury, why should it not have the same broad sense with respect to the
indirect injury inflicted by a neglect? Is it a reason or an assumption to say that the statutory expression of trespass to property,
real or personal, means damage done to some particular piece of
property, and not an injury to the property in general ? If it is
correct to translate the word "trespass" in this clause by the word
"wrong," it seems impossible to resist the conclusion that a wrong
to personal property is done as manifestly when one's personalty in
the aggregate is injured, as when some particular item of it is damnified. The fact is, the discrimination, taken at its best, would be
but a vague and shadowy one, for it seldom, if ever, happens that a
loss falls upon a person's general estate, except by means of an
injury to some particular part of it. Thus, if A. should destroy by
his carelessness bank notes, the property of B., to the amount of
$1000, under the rule suggested an action would survive; but if B.
lost these same bank notes through the deceit of A., an action would
not survive. The idea that the legislature intended to give transmissibility to the former of these actions, and not to the latter, is
absolutely not credible. This proposed test of the applicability of
the statute, arising from the specialness of the wrong done, does
not appear to be countenanced by the statutory language, and it
certainly does not commend itself by its results. It requires the
same word, standing in a clause of a statute, to have a two-fold
meaning, being broadened in its application to one set of facts, and
narrowed in view of another set, and occasions an action to survive
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in one class of cases, and to non-survive in another, where the loss
suffered in each, is, in substance, of the same character, and where
the necessity for redress in the one is equal to that in the other.
The exigency should be pressing indeed that should lead to the
adoption of such a rule.
The fact is, the real question to be solved is whether these clauses
of this act are to be constructed strictly, or with the utmost latitude
of interpretation, in view of its being a remedial act. In the case
of Ten Eyck v. Bunkc, the latter course was pursued, and it seems
*to me that method was strictly correct. This law was plainly intended to take the place, in an improved and amplified form, of the
Statute of Edward III., c. 7, de bonis asportatis in rita testatoris,
and its purpose was to remove the same absurdities that had crept
into the law by a technical adherence to the words rather than to
the spirit of the old maxim, aetio personali8 moritur cum per8ona.
This substitute, and its antitype, dre obviously in pari materia.
The statute of Edward applied, according to its letter, only to goods
carried away in the lifetime of the testator, but by a most liberal
construction it was extended to remedy many other wrongs, some
of which are referred to in the opinion in Ten Eyck v. Bunke, and
it would not be consistent with customary rules, I think, to refuse
to exercise a like liberality in the interpretation of this substituted
act. By ascribing to the term "trespass" the signification of tort,
or wrong, and which is one of its meanings, the remedy is made
approximately commensurate with the evil to be eradicated, and in
this way actions for deceits and neglects will survive, as well is those
in which the loss follows immediately from the tortious act. The
language of the act is comprehensive enough for this purpose, and
it is hardly permissible to impute a lesser design to the legislature,
for there is a great incongruity in a plan that imparts the quality
of survival to an action for a forcible injury, and which withholds
the same quality from an action for a neglect or deceit. The one
class of wrongs is, in general, no more culpable than the other, and
the injurious results, in some cases, are identical in each. If a physician should intentionally inflict a wound on his patient, the action,
it is clear, would, by force of the statute, survive; and, surely, if
the same wound were occasioned by want of skill, or carelessness,
the same result should obtain.
And it is with respect to the class of cases illustrated by the example just adduced, that the counsel of the defendant interposes

TICHENOR v. HIYES.

another objection to the rule of construction above indicated. The
point is strongly pressed, and it is this, that in that class of cases in
which, at common law, a loss sustained may be considered at the
option of the party injured, as the consequence either of a breach
of duty or of a breach of contract, it could not have been the intention to bring such class within the operation of this act. The reason assigned for this contention is that the person injured can sue
the personal representative of the person inflicting the loss, for the
breach of the contract, and consequently there was no necessity for
legislative intervention. Thus, it is said, and said with truth, that
upon general principles the culpable attorney or physician may be
sued either for the breach of the implied contract, which obliges him to
the exercise of skill and care, or in tort for a breach of duty with
respect to the same particulars; and from this it is argued that as
the former action will survive at common law, it is not to be supposed that it was the design uselessly to endow the latter with a similar vitality. But the cases presented in the commencement of
these remarks deprive this contention of almost all its cogency, for
those cases show that the remedy that survives against the representatives of a deceased promise-breaker, in this class of cases, is
one that is most incomplete, for no damages can be recovered in such
suit, except such as have directly diminished the estate of the deceased. As an illustration, it appears in these cases that if a personal injury is occasioned by the negligence of a carrier, that in a
suit by the administrator of such person injured, in an action, ex
contractr, which is the only one the common law keeps alive after
the injured person's death, the only damages recoverable are those
that go to the impairment of the estate, and that there can be no
compensation claimed for personal suffering. Such a redress is so
imperfect that it can raise up no implication against a legislative
design to keep alive the concurrent remedy for the tort, which is
somewhat adequate, if not absolutely complete.
The above rule of construction which I have indicated should be
adopted, receives countenance fiom the views of the English courts,
expressed with reference to the correct exposition of the Statute of
8 & 4 Win. IV., c. 42, § 2, an act, which, with respect to the point
now in question, bears considerable similarity to the clause of the
statute now being considered. That act provides, that an action
may be "maintained against the executors or administrators of any
person, deceased, for any wrong committed by him in his lifetime
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to another in respect to his property, real or personal, so as such
injury shall have been committed within six calendar months before such person's death," &c. The important inquiry in the present connection is, what interpretation was put upon the expression
"wrong" with respect to property, real or personal.
This provision was considered in its bearing upon the case of Iorgan v. Ravey, .6 Hurl. & Nor. 265, which was an action in assumpsit against the executors of an innkeeper for breach of his implied
contract to keep safely the goods of a guest. The question mooted
was whether the law would imply a contract under the circumstaneps,
but the court said: "It is not, however, necessary to determine
this if the plaintiff elects to amend, which he may do and we think
successfully, because it seems to us, notwithstanding the ingenious
argument of Mr. Pkinn, that if the claim against the defendant
is for a tort, it is for a ' wrong committed' within the meaning of
the 3 & 4 Win. IV., c. 42, §2." The counsel of the defendant in
his brief appears to consider this also a case of "direct injury to
specific property," but I am not able to draw any sensible line of
discrimination between the consequential loss of goods arising from
a neglect, and the consequential loss of a sum of money by the
same means. The decision seems to me to be much in point and
is entitled to much weight.
The same statute entered somewhat into the consideration of the
case of Powell v. Bees, 7 Ad. & El. 426, and the general tendency
of this decision is in the same direction with the rulings in the
judgment just cited; and it has also this particular importance in
our present inquiry, that it rules that this statute of William applies
to that class of cases before referred to, in which at common law,
the remedy is concurrent by an action ex contractu or ex delicto.
But I think the observation and decision of the court, in the case
of -Erskinev. Adeane, Law Rep. 8 Ch. Ap. 756, are more to our
present purpose. There a claim was made by a landowner against
the executors of a deceased tenant for life, for injury to his cattle
by reason of the negligence of the deceased with respect to certain
yew trees, in providing insufficient fences and for throwing the
cuttings on the plaintiff's land. The cattle in question were poisoned by eating of the yew trees and the cuttings thus exposed to
them. Thus it appears the gravamen of the claim was for the consequential damages resulting from the negligence of the deceased.
It was held, that while it was evident such an action would not
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have lain at common law, it could be brought at any time within
thle period limited, by the statute of William. This judgment rests
upon the ground, that the neglect in question and which resulted
in the loss of-the cattle, was a wrong to personal property within
the sense of those terms in the statute, and it is in consequence
plain that this judgment is of much authority in our present investigation, unless a difference can be established with respect to principle, between a loss of particular cattle by a neglect and the loss
of particular moneys from the same cause. I cannot perceive such
difference.
In Massachusetts, a literal interpretation has been put upon the
statute of that state upon this subject, a result which may, in a
degree be accounted for by the peculiar frame of the act, which is
in the nature of an enumeration of the classes of cases in which
actions shall survive and which enumeration would upon admitted
principles, tend to contract the scope of the general terms used in
the subsequent part of the section.
The judgment, I think, should be for the plaintiff in the present
case.

United State8 Circuit Court, -EasternDistrict of Pennylvania.
EDWARD SCHUBERTH & Co. v. W. F. SHAW.
Any substantially new adaptation of an old piece of music constitutes a valid

subject for copyright.

IN the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In 1872 a Frenchman composed a piece of music under the title
of "Manola suite de Valses pour piano." In 1875 J M. Lauder,
an American musician, made a vew arrangement of the waltz which
he sold to plaintiffs, who copyrighted the same as proprietors under
the name and style of "Manola Waltz, as played and arranged for
piano by J. M. Lauder." The defendant, W. F. Shaw, a musical
publisher, issued a composition under title of "Manola Waltz, as
performed by J. M. Lauder."
A bill was thereupon filed charging an infringement of the copyright and asking an injunction. The defendant in his answer and
evidence contended that there was no musical authorship in the
arrangement of Lauder, and that the plaintiffs, as proprietors,
could not avail themselves of the benefit of the copyright.
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On the argument, BUTLER, J., made an interlocutory decree,
"that two musicians should report if the Lauder composition was
musical / different from that of the French composer, and whether
in their judgment and opinion the publication of plaintiffs' is an
original composition, representing any musical authorship."
The experts made report that, "with the exception of the harmony
in the last three bars, they did not consider the publication of the
plaintiffs' an original composition," but did regard it "as an original
arrangement and the work of a practical harmonist and musician."
David W. Sellers, for plaintiffs, moved for the injunction, and
cited, Jletzler v. Wood, Law Rep. 8 Ch. Div. 606; Drone on
Copyrights 175.
Joseph B. Sypher, for defendant, contra, cited, Morgan Law of
Literature, vol. 2, chap. 7, 693.
BUTLER, J.-Under the construction given to sect. 4952 of the
Revised Statutes, relating to copyrights, the plaintiffA' claim must
be regarded as valid. To entitle one to a copyright it is unnecessary that he be the sole creator of the work for which protection is claimed. Labor bestowed on the production of another
will often constitute a valid claim. The maker of an abridgement,
translation, dramatization, digest, index or concordance of a work
of which he is not the author, may obtain a copyright for the
product of his labor, thought and skill. So also one making material changes, additions, corrections, improvements, notes, comments, &c., in the unprotected work of another. A photograph,
chromo or engraving is often but a copy of a work of art, in whose
production the photographer or engraver had no part: Wood v.
Boosey, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 232. In all such cases, the test of originality is applied to that which represents the labor or skill of the
person claiming the copyright: Drone on Copyright 200. In music, not only new compositions, but any substantially new adaptation of an old piece, as an arrangement for the piano of a quadrille
waltz, &c., constitutes a valid claim: Atwill v. Terrett, 2 Blatchf.
39; Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Id. 618.
The report of the commissioners (Messrs. Thunder & Hiasler),
leaves me in no doubt respecting the validity of the plaintiff's copy
right. Nor can I doubt that the defendants' publication is a substantial copy of the plaintiff's. His artist, Mr. A'Becket, under
VOL. XXVII.-32
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standing what was wanted, sought to do materially what the plain
tiffs had done. The defendant's design was to procure a simila
work. The evidence shows this quite distinctly. Mr. A'Becket
had not as he says, the plaintiff's work before him; but he was
familiar with it and was, I think, mainly guided in what he did, by
his recollection of it. The imitations, in some instances extending even to errors, seem too remarkable to be accidental. The
slight, unimportant differences may well be ascribed to a desire to
avoid the charge of copying. It is, I repeat, quite plain that the
defendant started out with the design to publish and offer for sale,
a work similar to the plaintiff's; and this similarity is carried even
into the title page; which is made so like the plaintiff's, that any
one purchasing might well suppose he was getting the plaintiff's
work. The answer indeed admits that the defendant's publication
"is substantially the same as the complainant's." Let a decree be
entered for the plaintiff.

United States Cireuit Court, -astern District of Pennsylvania.
HALL v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY.
A common carrier is liable for loss of goods in his charge, from any cause, except
the act of God, or of the public enemy. When he has received the goods under a bill of
lading his liability continues, as at common law, except as regards losses by causes
enumerated as exceptions in the bill of lading, without negligence on his part.
His duty being to transport goods without unreasonable delay, any injurious
interruption of such transport, by the refusal of his servants or employees to perform
their duty, would make him liable for damages.
A strike of its employees is therefore no defence to a railroad company in an action
for demages for delay in transportation.
A mob is not "the public enemy," and destruction of goods by it, will not excuse
the carrier, although its force was greater than he was able to resist, and although he
promptly called upon the civil authorities for protection.
But where goods were accepted by a carrier under a bill of lading, by which he
was not to be liable for loss by fire without negligence on his part, and the goods
were stopped on their transit for two days, and then burned by a mob, it was held that
negligence could not be imputed to the carrier, and the loss was witbin the exception
of the bill of lading.

THIS suit was brought to recover from the defendant the value of
certain wool, delivered to it at Chicago for transportation to Philadelphia. A jury having been waived, the case was tried by the
court upon the evidence submitted by the parties. The following
facts were found as established by the evidence:

HALL v. PENNSYLVAN1A RAILROAD CONPANY.

1. The value of the goods in controversy was, on the 22d day of
July 1877, at the point of shipment, $18,060.38, and at the point
of destination, $20,972.97.
2. The said goods had, in course of transit from their place of
shipment to their respective destinations, reached the city of Pittsburgh at least twenty-four hours before the fire occurred in said
city, on July 21st and 22d 1877, and were then in defendant's custody in the cars in which they had been shipped, and the said cars
and the said goods were burned in said fire.
3. The defendant, about July 19th 1877, found itself unable to
maintain, against the force of a mob, entire possession and control
of its own property, and the property in its custody, including that
of the plaintiff, and to operate its road. It then called upon the
proper authorities, including the sheriff of Allegheny county, for
assistance and protection; a requisition was made by said sheriff
upon the governor for the assistance of the military power of the
Commonwealth. In pursuance of such requisition, troops were
ordered by the governor to aid said sheriff in re-taking and re-delivering to the defendant entire possession and control of such property, and to enable it to operate its road; and in endeavoring so
to do, said troops, on July 21st 1877, came into conflict with said
mob and failed to dispossess the same, and immediately after said
conflict and failure the property in question was destroyed by fire
communicated by said mob.
4. The goods in question were received by the defendant on bills of
lading, usually known as the "Red Star Union Line Fast Freight"
receipts, with all and singular the conditions therein contained.
This bill of lading contained conditions, interalia, that the defendant
should not be liable "for damage to perishable property of any kind,
occasioned by delays from any cause, or by changes of weather; nor
for loss or damage on any article or property whatever, by fire or other
casualty, while in transit or while in depots or other places of transshipment, or at depots or landings at point of delivery; nor for loss
or damage by fire, collision or the dangers of navigation while on
seas, rivers, lakes or canals."
5. If the transit of the goods in question had not been interrupted at Pittsburgh and had been continued in regular course, the
train containing them would have been at a considerable distance
from Pittsburgh eastward before the time of the occurrence of the
fire.
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6. When the train containing said goods reached the depot of
the defendant, in Pittsburgh, on July 19th, the hands who had conducted it there left it, and a "strike" of all the regular train hands
of the defendant occurred on that day, in consequence of a refusal
by the defendant to accede to their demand for an increase of
wages.
7. On the 19th of July, there were standing on the track in the
depot yard at Pittsburgh, a number of cars laden with petroleum,
about one hundred and fifty yards distant from the cars which contained the plaintiff's goods. They were in the same relative position on the day when the fire occurred. The oil cars were kept in
place by ordinary brakes. The grade of the road was descending
towards the freight cars, so that the oil cars would run towards the
former by their own gravity. At or before the occurrence of the
fire, the oil cars were caused to move down the grade until they
came in contact with the freight cars, and they were all burned up
together.
8. On the 19th, 20th and 21st of July, freight trains continued
to be brought into the depot yard of the defendant, at Pittsburgh,
both from the east and west, in the regular course of transit, and
were there stopped, so that there was an unusual accumulation of
trains at that point.
Upon these facts, the plaintiff prayed the court to enter judgment for $20,973.97 and interest, from July 22d 1877 to the day
judgment should be rendered.

John Fallon, for plaintiff.
Wayne .HelVeagh and &a.pman

Biddle, for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
McKE AN, Circuit J.-The court has been requested by plaintiff to find as matters of law:
I. "That defendant's duty as a common carrier was to carry
plaintiff's goods from the several points of shipment to * * *
Philadelphia, the point of delivery of all, without any unusual or
avoidable delay, and apart from the special conditions in the bill
of lading, defendant is liable for loss from any cause, save the acts
of God or a public enemy."
This proposition is affirmed.
I. "That defendant did not cease to be a common carrier by
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teason of the conditions in the bill of lading, but continued subject
to all liabilities of common carriers, except for losses happening
for causes enumerated in said conditions, without default or negligence on the part of defendant's servants or employees, while defendant was actually discharging its duties of carrying the goods
from the point of shipment in the usual and proper manner."
This is also affirmed.
IEI. "That the interruption of the transit by reason of the refusal of the servants of defendant, in charge of their freight trains
on which plaintiff's goods were being carried to perform their duty,
was a default on part of defendant."
As it was the duty of the defendant, as a common carrier, to
transport the goods of the plaintiff to their point of destination,
without unreasonable delay, any injurious interruption of such
transportation, by the refusal of the defendant's servants to perform their duty, would be a breach of duty imputable to it; and
for any loss to the plaintiff caused by such delay, the defendant
would be liable in damages.
IV. "That the strike and refusal to perform duty on the part
of the men does not justify or excuse the interruption of the transit
of plaintiff's goods; and that defendant's election not to pay the
tean per cent. additional wages demanded, and in lieu thereof to
allow the goods to remain at Pittsburgh, wholly or partly in the
control of persons who prevented defendant from 'operating its
road' and performing its contract as a common carrier, makes defendant liable for all the consequences, including the destruction
and loss of said goods during the period that the transit was thus
interrupted and the plaintiff's property thus wrongfully controlled,
without proof of any other negligence or misconduct on part of
defendant."
I decline to affirm this proposition. The evidence does not show
that the loss complained of was caused by the "strike," nor that
any permissive allowance of the retention of the goods at Pittsburgh can be imputed to the defendant. On the contrary, it is
admitted by the plaintiff, that the defendant was coerced by the
superior power of a lawless mob, which usurped control of the
train containing the plaintiff's goods and prevented the defendant
from operating its road; that the defendant took prompt steps" to
meet the emergency by an appeal to the civil authorities for protection and assistance; that these authorities, with the military force
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summoned by them were repelled; and that the train with these
goods was thereupon destroyed by an incendiary fire.
While these circumstances would not protect the defendant
against a failure to fulfil its obligation as a common carrier, yet I
cannot say that an involuntary, technical default warrants an imputation of negligence to the defendant touching a cause of loss,
which is expressly excepted from its liability.
V. "That allowing or suffering others than their own employees
to take from defendant the possession or control, whether in whole
or in part, of plaintiff's goods, and to use that control, not for the
purpose of furthering or continuing the transit, but for the purpose
of suspending and preventing it, was a default on part of defendant."
The defendant was deprived of the control of the train containing
the plaintiff's goods, and was prevented from continuing their transit
by a force it was unable to resist. It cannot be held responsible for
the purpose of the mob, although the act of the mob in intercepting
the transportation of the goods might subject the defendant to compensation to the plaintiff for any loss sustained by him by reason of
such interrupted transit of his goods. I decline, therefore, to affirm
this proposition.
VI. "That however proper it may have been for defendant to
call on the public authorities for protection and assistance, I in retaking and re-delivering to defendant the entire' 'possession and
control of said property,' such act of propriety in no way justifies
the previous default in suffering the possession and control thereof
to pass out of its hands."
This proposition is affirmed, with the qualification that I do not
say that the defendant was in default, otherwise than as, and for the
reason stated in the answer to proposition IV.
VII. "That the various risks enumerated in said conditions,
which are assumed by plaintiff in relief of defendant's general liability, and more especially the risk 'of fire while in transit,' are
limited to losses occurring while the defendant is engaged in carrying the goods, in the proper discharge of its duties under its contract, and do not include loss by fire, occurring while the transit is
suspended, and the goods in question have been suffered by defend:rnt to pass into the possession and control of persons acting adversely to the duties defendant assumed to discharge."
1 decline to affirm this proposition. The exception in the bill of
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lading is, that the carrier shall not be liable "for loss or damage on
any article or property whatever, by fire or other casualty, while
in transit, or while in depots or places of transshipment." The engagement of the carrier is to assume the custody of the property
intrusted to him at the point of shipment, and to deliver it at the
place of destination, and the obvious intent, as well, I think, as tHe
cleat import of the exception, is to protect him against the consequences of fire during the continuance of his duty as a carrier. His
qualified liability is co-extensive with his duty, and he forfeits its
protection only by some fault of his own, in connection with the
casualty to which the exception refers. Nor can I regard it as
within the reason of the exception to hold, that it is eliminated from
the contract when the property in the carrier's charge is wrested
from him by a hostile force, which he is unable to resist, and it is
consumed in an incendiary fire, although his exclusion from the
possession and control of it may last for two days before it is thus
destroyed.
VIII. "That it was gross default and negligence on part of
defendant to allow freight trains to come into Pittsburgh on the 19th,
20th and 21st of July, under the circumstances."
I decline to affirm this proposition.
IX. "That it was gross default and negligence to allow cars loaded
with petroleum to continue to stand on the track, under all the circumstances and manner, and for the period of time in the 8th clause
of the foregoing statement of facts."
I decline to affirm this proposition, for the reasons that the petroleum cars were presumably in the usual and proper place for them
in the depot yard; that they were at- a safe distance from the cars
containing the plaintiff's goods, and were there secured by mechanical applicances usually employed for that purpose, that they might
lawfully be kept there, and that their removal into contact with the
other cars was the act of the incendiary mob which had, for two
days before, maintained a forcible mastery of the situation.
X. "That defendant is responsible for the misconduct and default
of the persons whom it suffered to take control and possession,
wholly or jointly with itself, of plaintiff's property, and to continue
in such control for the space of two or three days, during the period
of time while that control and possession continued, and for all loss
resulting from such misconduct."
I decline to affirm this proposition.
Upon the whole case, I am of the opinion, and so find, that the

